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When people speak, they often insinuate their intent indirectly rather than stating it as a bald proposition. Examples include sexual
come-ons, veiled threats, polite requests, and concealed bribes. We propose a three-part theory of indirect speech, based on the idea
that human communication involves a mixture of cooperation and conﬂict. First, indirect requests allow for plausible deniability, in
which a cooperative listener can accept the request, but an uncooperative one cannot react adversarially to it. This intuition is sup-
ported by a game-theoretic model that predicts the costs and beneﬁts to a speaker of direct and indirect requests. Second, language
has two functions: to convey information and to negotiate the type of relationship holding between speaker and hearer (in particu-
lar, dominance, communality, or reciprocity). The emotional costs of a mismatch in the assumed relationship type can create a need
for plausible deniability and, thereby, select for indirectness even when there are no tangible costs. Third, people perceive language
as a digital medium, which allows a sentence to generate common knowledge, to propagate a message with high ﬁdelity, and to
serve as a reference point in coordination games. This feature makes an indirect request qualitatively different from a direct one
even when the speaker and listener can infer each other’s intentions with high conﬁdence.
P
eople often don’t blurt out what
they mean in so many words but
veil their intentions in innuendo,
euphemism, or doublespeak. Here
are some familiar examples:
Y Would you like to come up and see
my etchings? [a sexual come-on]
Y If you could pass the guacamole, that
would be awesome. [a polite request]
Y Nice store you got there. Would be a
real shame if something happened to
it. [a threat]
Y We’re counting on you to show lead-
ership in our Campaign for the Fu-
ture. [a solicitation for a donation]
Y Gee, officer, is there some way we
could take care of the ticket here? [a
bribe]
This phenomenon poses a theoretical puz-
zle. Indirect speech is inefficient, vulnera-
ble to being misunderstood, and seemingly
unnecessary (because only a naı ¨f could
fail to see past the literal meaning). Yet
politeness and other forms of indirectness
in speech appear to be universal or nearly
so (1). We all play this game and may be
offended at those who don’t, setting the
stage for the hypocrisy and taboo in social
life that are ubiquitously decried, yet ubiq-
uitously obeyed.
Indirect speech also has considerable
practical importance. It figures in the de-
sign of computer language understanding
systems, which need to be programmed
not to take indirect requests, such as ‘‘Can
you tell me . . .’’ or ‘‘Do you know . . . ,’’
literally. It is also a major bone of conten-
tion in the framing and interpretation of
diplomatic agreements, and in the prose-
cution of bribery, extortion, and sexual
harassment.
For 50 years, indirect speech has been
intensively studied by linguists, philoso-
phers, and psycholinguists, and the pro-
cesses by which speakers veil their
requests and hearers recover them have
been well documented (1–3). However,
the reason people engage in these maneu-
vers in the first place (as opposed to say-
ing what they mean clearly and succinctly)
is still largely unexplained. In this Perspec-
tive, we apply ideas from the analysis of
signaling in evolutionary biology and from
evolutionary game theory to illuminate
possible advantages of indirect speech (4).
Existing theories of indirect speech are
based on the premise that human conver-
sation is an exercise in pure cooperation,
in which conversational partners work
together toward a common goal—the effi-
cient exchange of information, in the in-
fluential theory of H. P. Grice (5), or the
maintenance of ‘‘face’’ (esteem and auton-
omy) in Penelope Brown and Stephen
Levinson’s Politeness Theory (1). Yet a
fundamental insight from evolutionary
biology is that most social relationships
involve combinations of cooperation and
conflict (6, 7). This insight applies to com-
munication among organisms no less than
to physical actions, and indeed animal
signaling has been found to involve ex-
ploitative manipulation as well as the co-
operative exchange of information (8). In
the human case, one has to think only of
threats (the proverbial ‘‘offer you can’t
refuse’’), dangerous secrets (hence the
need for witness protection programs),
contaminating leakage (such in blind ref-
ereeing, sealed bids, and clinical trials),
and incriminating questions (for which
one answer might be damaging, the other
a lie, and a refusal to answer a de facto
confession that those are the respondent’s
two options) (ref. 9; see also Gerd Giger-
enzer’s Law of Indispensable Ignor-
ance, www.edge.org/q2004/page2.html#
gigerenzer). The very existence of indi-
rectness in language suggests that such
adversarial dynamics might be in play in
human communication. In cases of pure
cooperation, one expects maximally effi-
cient conspiratorial whispers; in cases of
pure conflict, one expects a shouting
match (8). The complex, coded communi-
que ´s that characterize human language
bespeak a mixture of cooperation and
conflict. This conclusion is reinforced by
considering that most of the practical ap-
plications of indirect speech (diplomacy,
extortion, bribery, and sexual harassment)
take place in arenas of conflict.
Indirect speech takes many forms, in-
cluding gestures of sympathy and defer-
ence (termed ‘‘positive politeness’’ and
‘‘negative politeness’’ in Politeness The-
ory). The phenomenon we address here is
sometimes called ‘‘off-record indirect
speech acts.’’ We propose a theory in
three parts, which apply to interactions
with successively more subtle cost–benefit
structures (4). The first part is the logic of
plausible deniability. In a simple case like
bribing a police officer, the appeal of a
veiled bribe is intuitively clear: If some
officers are corrupt and would accept the
bribe, but others are honest and might
arrest the driver for bribery, an indirect
bribe can be detected by the corrupt cop
while not being blatant enough for the
honest cop to prove it beyond a reason-
able doubt. A simple game-theoretic
model can delineate the circumstances in
which indirect speech is an optimal solu-
tion to this problem.
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game-theoretic logic to social situations in
which there are no fines or other tangible
costs and benefits, such as a diner without
a restaurant reservation who bribes a mai-
tre d’ for a quick table, or a person who
tenders a sexual invitation to a friend af-
ter a dinner. Unlike the driver and the
officer, the speaker would incur no finan-
cial or judicial penalty were the hearer to
turn down a blatant proposition, so the
question here is why speakers still resort
to innuendo.
The third part addresses scenarios in
which people use indirect speech even
when the degree of uncertainty about the
other’s intentions is low—either because
variance among listeners’ values is low (so
speakers’ confidence in their values is
high), or because the listener is astute
enough to understand the intent of a
speaker’s innuendo with high confidence.
Why, in such cases, is a thinly veiled prop-
osition still more acceptable than a naked
one? The answer must pertain to some
property of overt language itself, as op-
posed to the processes of social inference
that power the interpretation of innuendo.
Part 1: Plausible Deniability
Consider a speaker whose speech obeys
Grice’s maxims (5) of efficient communi-
cation and is thereby always succinct,
truthful, direct, and relevant. He is pulled
over for running a red light and is pon-
dering whether to bribe the officer. His
choice is whether to remain silent or to
say, ‘‘If you let me go without a ticket, I’ll
pay you $50.’’
Unfortunately, he doesn’t know
whether the officer is corrupt and will
accept the bribe or is honest and will ar-
rest him for attempting to bribe an officer.
The game-theoretic conundrum where
one actor does not know the values of the
other has been explored by Thomas
Schelling, who calls it the Identification
Problem (9). The payoffs are as follows:
If the driver doesn’t try to bribe the
officer (first row), either way he gets a
ticket; if he does offer the bribe (second
row), the stakes are much higher either
way: going free with just the cost of the
bribe if he is facing a dishonest cop, or an
arrest for bribery if he is facing an hon-
est one.
Now consider a driver who knows how
to use an ‘‘implicature’’ to convey an am-
biguous bribe (‘‘So maybe the best thing
would be to take care of it here’’). Sup-
pose he knows that the officer can recog-
nize it as an intended bribe, and that the
officer knows that he couldn’t make a
bribery charge stick in court because the
ambiguous wording would prevent a pros-
ecutor from proving his guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. The driver now has a
third option:
The payoffs in this third row com-
bine the very large advantage of brib-
ing a dishonest cop with the relatively
small penalty of failing to bribe an
honest one. In these circumstances,
indirect speech is the rational option.
Note how this analysis is inconsistent
with the traditional idea that indirect
speech is an implementation of pure
cooperation: The driver here is using
indirect speech not to help the honest
officer attain his goal (viz., to enforce
the law) but rather to confound that
goal.
The intuition that indirect speech can
be an optimal strategy can be confirmed
in a simple model of a Rational Briber.
The expected cost of a bribe y can be cal-
culated from (i) the proportion of officers
that are honest, q;( ii) the cost of the
bribe, c0;( iii) the cost of the ticket, c1
(which must be greater than the cost of
the bribe, or it would never pay to bribe);
(iv) the cost of an arrest for bribery, c2
(which must be greater than the cost of
the ticket; otherwise, it would always pay
to bribe); and, the crucial psychological
variable, (v) the probability p that an offi-
cer will treat a statement with a given de-
gree of directness d as an attempted bribe.
Directness is a semantic variable that cor-
responds to the degree of vagueness of
the proposition (the number of readings)
and the proportion of those readings that
are consistent with its being a bribe rather
than an innocent remark. An if–then prop-
osition (‘‘If you let me go, I will give you
$50’’) is most direct; a leading question
(‘‘Is there some way to take care of it
here?’’) is less direct; and a generic re-
mark (‘‘I’ve learned my lesson; you don’t
have to worry about me doing this again’’)
is least direct. (In practice, p can be esti-
mated empirically by asking people their
degree of confidence that a given sen-
tence was intended as a bribe.) Finally,
the target of the indirect speech must de-
cide how to react to the proposition; this
tendency can be captured by a decision
function, L, which monotonically relates
the directness of the proposition to the
probability that the officer will treat it as
an attempted bribe and act accordingly.
Putting these together, the expected cost
to a driver facing a corrupt cop is yc  
c0 p   c1(1   p); the cost when facing an
honest cop is yh   c2 p   c1(1   p); alto-
gether, the driver’s expected cost is y  
qyh   (1   q)yc.
Now, if the corrupt and honest cops
share a single linear decision function
L and hence have the same p for any
proposition, the optimal level of direct-
ness will simply be determined by the
fraction of honest officers. If q   (c1
  c0)/(c2   c0), then the optimum
strategy for the driver is not to make
any bribing attempt at all: d   0. If the
fraction of honest officers is less than
this critical value, then the optimum
strategy for the driver is to make the
most direct and unambiguous bribing
attempt, d   1. In this model, so far,
indirect speech is never an optimum
strategy. The reason is that the cost
functions are linear in d (Fig. 1).
For an indirect bribe to be advanta-
geous to the driver, his overall cost
function must be nonlinear. This situa-
tion could come about if the honest
and corrupt officers employ nonlinear
decision functions Lh and Lc relating
the probability they will act (p) to the
directness of the bribe (d), and if the
two decision functions are distinct.
That is, even if honest and dishonest
officers interpret indirect speech the
same way, and thus have identical as-
sessments as whether an invitation to
‘‘settle it here’’ is an attempted bribe,
the honest cop may be more hesitant
to arrest the driver than the dishonest
cop is to accept the implicit bribe, be-
cause of the burden of proof in a pros-
ecution. In general, the expected cost
for the driver is as follows:
y   q c2Lh d    c1 1   Lh d       1   q 
   c0Lc d    c1 1   Lc d   
In the simple case in which Lh and Lc
are step functions, the scenario may be
displayed as in Fig. 2.
The expected cost for the driver is as
follows:
y   c1 if d   dc
y   qc1    1   q c0 if dc   d   dh
y   qc2    1   q c0 if dh   d
The intermediate region, dc   d   dh, has
the lowest expected cost for the driver
and, therefore, represents the optimum
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ticket
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that there are plausible circumstances in
which indirect speech is an optimal strat-
egy and is a formal implementation of the
everyday concept of plausible deniability.
The result does not depend on the of-
ficers’ decision rules Lh and Lc being step-
functions. They could also be sigmoid
functions such as logistic or normal-ogive.
As long as corrupt officers have lower
threshold parameters than honest officers
in their sigmoid function, that is, Lh(d)  
Lc(d) over some appreciable interval, it is
easy to show that a wide range of parame-
ter values yields a minimum of y with
respect to d between the boundaries of
silence at one end and bald directness at
the other. The results also hold when
there are distributions of the threshold
parameters in the two populations of po-
lice officers. Yet another plausible exten-
sion to real life is the use of a sequence of
statements escalating in directness (2),
thereby probing the reaction of the officer
(‘‘What a beautiful morning. I’m very
sorry for speeding. I know I’ll have to pay
for my mistake. I admire officers doing
their duty. Can I make a contribution to
the policeman’s benevolent association? Is
there some way we could avoid the paper-
work and settle it here?’’).
How plausible is the key assumption
that the decision functions of honest and
dishonest officers differ? The answer de-
pends on the determinants of their cost
functions. Take the honest officer: why
wouldn’t he arrest anyone who offered a
veiled bribe, exactly as a dishonest officer
would accept all such bribes? The reason
is that even if all dishonest drivers offer
remarks that can be interpreted (cor-
rectly) as implicated bribes, some honest
drivers make those remarks too, as inno-
cent observations (this is inherent to the
definition of indirectness), so any arrest
might be unsuccessful. An unsuccessful
arrest might be costly to the officer, ex-
posing him to a charge of false arrest and
the police department to punitive dam-
ages. The cost to the honest officer of
arresting the driver will thus depend on
the proportion of dishonest and honest
drivers who utter a remark with that level
of directness, and on the professional
rewards for successful arrests and the pen-
alties for false ones. Conversely, for a dis-
honest cop, the cost depends on the
amount of the bribe, the chances of his
being arrested in a sting operation, and
the penalty for being convicted of accept-
ing a bribe. It is unlikely that the two de-
cision functions would have the same
shape.
Part 2: Relationship Negotiation
The second puzzle of indirect speech is
why people use it in nonlegal situations,
where there are no financial or legal pay-
offs and penalties. Consider bribery in
everyday life, such as bribing a maitre d’
at a popular restaurant to be seated im-
mediately despite having no reservation.
A restaurant critic, given the assignment
to write about such an experience for
Gourmet magazine (10), reported that the
prospect of being turned down filled him
with anxiety and that he resorted to indi-
rect speech to tender the bribe, such as ‘‘I
hope you can fit us in’’ or ‘‘I was wonder-
ing if you might have a cancellation.’’ The
second part of the theory thus seeks to
explain why speech would be indirect in a
nonlegal context such as a restaurant
bribe or in a sexual overture among peers.
A key to this puzzle comes from Polite-
ness Theory (1), which proposes that lan-
guage serves two purposes: to convey a
proposition (e.g., a bribe, a command, an
offer) and to negotiate and maintain a
relationship. People achieve these dual
ends by using language at two levels. The
literal form of a sentence is consistent
with the safest relationship between
speaker and hearer. At the same time, by
implicating a meaning between the lines,
the speaker counts on the listener to infer
its real intent, which may initiate a differ-
ent relationship. For example, in a polite
request, such as ‘‘If you could pass the
salt, that would be awesome,’’ the literal
content violates Grice’s maxims of
efficient conversation (5) because it is ir-
relevant and untruthful (i.e., an overstate-
ment). The hearer implicitly reasons: ‘‘The
speaker is saying that an outcome of an
action by me is good. Therefore, he must
be requesting it.’’ The overall effect is that
the intended content—an imperative—
gets through, but without the presumption
of dominance that would ordinarily
accompany an imperative, with its tacit
assumption by the speaker that he can
expect the hearer’s compliance.
This reticence raises the question of
what kind of relationships, other than
dominance, people are mindful of when
choosing their words. Alan Fiske (11) has
advanced the strong claim that human
relationships in all cultures fall into only
three distinct types and that most of the
complexities of social life within and
across cultures may be explained in terms
of variation as to which relationship type
applies to a given dyad. (Fiske’s theory
also posits a fourth relationship type,
‘‘market pricing,’’ but holds that it is spe-
cific to industrial and postindustrial societ-
ies.) Each relationship type is character-
ized by an ethos governing the
distribution of resources between partici-
pants, and a straightforward evolutionary
basis that specifies which kinds of dyads
fall into that type of relationship by de-
fault. However, each relationship type can
be extended to other dyads by negotiation
and manipulation:
Y The dominance or authority relation-
ship is governed by the ethos, ‘‘Don’t
mess with me.’’ It has a basis in the
dominance hierarchies common in the
animal kingdom, although in humans,
it is based not just on brawn or se-
niority but on social recognition: how
much others are willing to defer to
you (12). It is generally communi-
cated by psychophysical cues to
strength and resolve (13).
Y The communality or communal shar-
ing relationship conforms to the
ethos, ‘‘What’s mine is thine; what’s
thine is mine.’’ It naturally arises
among kin, who are bound by shared
genes (14, 15), within monogamous
pair-bonds, who are bound by their
shared children (16), and by close
friends and allies, who are bound by
shared interests (17). It can be ex-
tended to others by nonverbal cues of
solidarity such as physical contact,
communal meals, and coordinated
movements and experiences (13).
Y The reciprocity or equality-matching
relationship obeys the ethos, ‘‘You
scratch my back; I’ll scratch yours.’’
It has an evolutionary basis in recip-
rocal altruism (18, 19). It is usually
signaled by tit-for-tat exchanges or
division into equal portions but, un-
like the other two relationship types,
can be negotiated by people via ex-
plicit verbal contracts (13).
The assumed relationship type among a
pair of individuals has dramatic effects on
the behavior that is acceptable between
them; not surprisingly, given that the rela-
tionship type governs the acceptable dis-
tribution of resources in a given social
setting (13, 17). Behavior that is accept-
able in one relationship type can thus be
anomalous in another. For example, at a
party, one might help oneself to a shrimp
off the plate of one’s spouse or sibling or
close friend (communality), but not off
cost
directness of proposition
honest
corrupt
explicit subtle
ticket
arrest
bribe
Fig. 1. The expected cost to a driver of tendering
bribes to honest and corrupt police ofﬁcers with
linear decision functions.
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a guest at a dinner party (communality)
would be perceived as crass, not fair, if at
the end of the meal he pulled out his wal-
let and offered to pay his host for the
meal (reciprocity).
When relationships are ambiguous, a
divergent understanding between the par-
ties can lead to the aversive emotion we
call ‘‘awkwardness.’’ There are awkward
moments in a workplace or university
when an underling or student makes a
transition from a subordinate (dominance)
to something closer to a friend (commu-
nality). Good friends (communality) are
advised not to engage in a business trans-
action (reciprocity), like the sale of a car
or a house, which can endanger the
friendship. The ambiguity between domi-
nance and sex (a kind of communal rela-
tionship) is the battleground of sexual
harassment conflicts, and the ambiguity
between friendship and sex gives rise to
the frisson of dating.
The ultimate reason that relationship
mismatches impose emotional costs (and
hence motivate the parties to align their
behavior with one relationship type or
another) is the familiar principle from
biology that cooperation is evolutionarily
fragile (because it is vulnerable to cheat-
ers), and that each variety of cooperation
depends on a particular set of circum-
stances being in place for the cooperation
to be adaptive (18, 19). Depending on
their ecological niche and evolutionary
antecedents, different organisms may co-
operate via nepotism, mutualism, or reci-
procity, or they may not cooperate at all,
ceding resources via contests of domi-
nance. Humans avail themselves of all of
these options, facultatively choosing
among them on the basis of their current
social context rather than on a fixed, phy-
logenetically typical one. The anxiety sur-
rounding relationship mismatches is the
price we pay for having multiple, context-
specific ways of allocating resources avail-
able, with the consequence that a given
type of behavior can vary radically in its
adaptive value depending on which
scheme is currently in effect. For example,
helping yourself to a person’s food or
other resources can be a prerogative in
the context of one relationship type but a
case of theft in another. Ordering some-
one around can be a requirement of your
job in one setting but a case of extortion
in another.
The fraught nature of divergent rela-
tionships gives rise to a social identifi-
cation problem that is isomorphic to
the legal identification problem de-
scribed by Schelling (9). In this case,
the emotional cost of a relationship
mismatch duplicates the payoff matrix
of other risky propositions. Take the
ambiguity between the authority rela-
tionship ordinarily commanded by a
maitre d’ (in which he assigns tables as
he pleases) and the reciprocity rela-
tionship suggested by a diner offering a
bribe (in which the maitre d’ would be
bound to offer a table in exchange for
the bribe). The payoff matrix is identi-
cal in structure to the one for bribing a
police officer, but the payoffs are reck-
oned by matches or mismatches in the
assumed relationship between the two
parties rather than in dollars and cents:
An implicated bribe (third row), such as
‘‘I was hoping you might have a cancella-
tion,’’ combines the best of the first two
rows: the high payoff of an overt bribe (a
quick table) with the low penalty of not
bribing at all (a long wait).
Part 3: Language as a Digital Medium
There is one remaining problem, which
arises in cases where speakers use indi-
rect speech despite a lack of genuine
uncertainty on the part of one or both
of the conversational partners. One such
case is when the Identification Problem
does not arise because the values of the
listener are known—for example, if all
of the police officers or maitre d’s in a
given city are known to be bribable. An-
other occurs when an indirect proposi-
tion is so conventional or transparent as
to leave no doubt in the hearer’s mind
as to what was intended (the probability
that it is interpreted as intended is close
to 1). That is, in many circumstances,
both parties know when an overture has
been made by innuendo. Can any adult
really claim to be fooled by the etchings,
the offer to ‘‘settle it here,’’ or the advi-
sory on the accidents that can befall a
store? Any ‘‘deniability’’ in these cases
is really not so plausible after all. The
puzzle, then, is why, in cases of low or
zero uncertainty about the agents’ val-
ues and intentions, an obvious indirect
overture should still feel less awkward
than a direct overture that is sensed to
be ‘‘out there’’ or ‘‘on the record.’’
This circumstance is addressed by
the third part of the theory, which
holds that language is tacitly perceived
to be a digital medium. Discreteness is
in the very design of human language.
Features, morphemes, words, and
phrases are concatenated, not blended,
and each one’s contribution to the
meaning of the whole is qualitative: A
sound that is halfway between to bat
and to pat does not refer to an action
that is halfway between batting and
patting. Moreover, in all languages,
real-world continua of space, time, and
matter are digitized into discrete cate-
gories such as in versus on, past versus
nonpast, and pebbles versus gravel
(4, 20). Propositions with discrete truth
values, too, may be conveyed through
the choice and arrangement of words.
This does not imply that in practice
linguistic information is transmitted
with perfect fidelity (the phenomenon
of indirect speech is an example to the
contrary), but the intuition that lan-
guage is a reliable medium is wide-
spread as a folk theory of language
(21), and belief in it may affect how
people choose and interpret their
words. This hypothesis has (at least)
three corollaries.
First, overt propositions are perceived
as certain, as opposed to merely highly
likely. The relevance to relationship nego-
tiation is that the signals of many relation-
ship types may be analogue and highly
ambiguous. How close does a man have to
sit to a woman, how lavishly can he com-
pliment her looks, and how secluded are
the locales he leads her to before she con-
cost
honest
corrupt
explicit subtle
ticket
arrest
bribe
corrupt
cop s
threshold
honest
cop s
threshold
directness of proposition 
Fig. 2. The expected cost to a driver of tendering
bribes to honest and corrupt police ofﬁcers with
nonlinear decision rules.
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Don’t bribe Long wait (dominance/
dominance)
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Awkwardness (reciprocity/
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Implicate bribe Instant seating (reciprocity/
reciprocity)
Long wait (dominance/
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must be accepted or rebuffed? When
faced with these ambiguities, people may
treat certainty as a ‘‘focal point’’ in Schell-
ing’s sense (9). A focal point is a salient
location that two rational agents can agree
on when they would be better off coordi-
nating their behavior than acting indepen-
dently, and when there is no rational basis
for choosing one value over another. Ex-
amples include a prominent landmark in a
city where separated spouses agree to
meet, or a round number that a buyer and
seller in a negotiation can settle on. Al-
though the preference for a focal point
(when one exists) is an inherently rational
strategy that does not depend on details
of the agents’ psychology, the question of
whether a focal point exists, and where in
the problem space it lies, depends on de-
tails of the local environment and on
common properties of the agents’ percep-
tual and cognitive systems that predictably
single out the same point as psychologi-
cally salient. Daniel Kahneman and Amos
Tversky, in their work on Prospect Theory
(22), have shown in studies of people’s
tolerance for risk that human psychology
categorically distinguishes 100% certainty
from all other probability values. We sug-
gest, then, that overt propositions are per-
ceived as certain and act as focal points,
whereas implicatures from indirect speech
are perceived as being some measure
short of certainty (even 99%). With the
lack of a focal point to trigger a change of
relationship, the speaker is given ‘‘the
benefit of the doubt,’’ and the relationship
can remain unchanged. The deniability,
then, doesn’t have to be plausible, only
possible.
A second corollary of language as a
digital medium invokes Erving Goffman’s
hypothesis (23) that people always behave
as if they are playing to an audience. A
crucial feature of indirect speech is that it
can be interpreted only in context. The
hearer’s interpretation taps into many as-
pects of the context, such as the lead-up
to the speech act, the speaker’s body lan-
guage, or his tone of voice. Overt proposi-
tions, in contrast, may be perceived as
context-free—their intent can be inter-
preted by eavesdroppers—and lossless—
their intent can be transmitted perfectly
along chains of gossipers (in the same way
that other digital media, such as files of
music or images, can be transmitted loss-
lessly). According to this hypothesis, the
deniability is plausible to the virtual audi-
ence, even if it is not particularly plausible
to the hearer, and people tacitly consult
the reactions of a virtual audience in re-
taining or switching relationship types.
The ultimate reason is that relationship
types are not solely dyadic but depend in
part on the tacit ratification of a commu-
nity, which may be necessary to back up
the authority of a dominant figure; yoke
the interests of couples, families, and
other communal groups; or disseminate
information about the probity of recipro-
cating partners (24).
The third corollary invokes a concept
that linguists, logicians, and economists
have called common knowledge, mutual
knowledge, and common ground (2, 9,
25–30). In common knowledge, not only
does A know x and B know x, but A
knows that B knows x, and B knows that
A knows x, and A knows that B knows
that A knows x, ad infinitum. As with
other phenomena in linguistics in which a
person is said to ‘‘know’’ an infinite num-
ber of things, the knowledge is not enu-
merated as an infinite list, of course, but
is implicit in a finite recursive formula. In
this case, it could be the formula y:
‘‘Everyone knows x, and everyone knows
y’’ (2). Moreover, common knowledge can
be ascertained perceptually, by observing
that x is perceptible or broadcasted in
public circumstances.
The paradigm illustration of common
knowledge is the story of the Emperor’s
New Clothes. When the boy called out,
‘‘The emperor is naked!’’ he was not tell-
ing the onlookers anything they didn’t
already know. Yet he was conveying
knowledge nonetheless: Now everyone
knew that everyone else knew, and that
everyone else knew that they knew, and
so on, and that common knowledge li-
censed the people to challenge the domi-
nance relationship commanded by the
emperor. The moral for the present the-
ory is that language is an efficient way of
generating common knowledge.
This corollary of the language-as-
digital-medium hypothesis, then, is that
indirect speech merely provides shared
individual knowledge, whereas direct
speech provides common knowledge, and
relationships are maintained or nullified
by common knowledge of the relationship
type. Imagine that Harry says, ‘‘Would
you like to come up and see my etch-
ings?’’ and Sally demurs. There is little or
no uncertainty about Harry’s intent, and
none about Sally’s: Sally knows that she
has turned down an overture, and Harry
knows that she has turned down an over-
ture. However, Sally doesn’t necessarily
know that Harry knows; she might think
to herself, ‘‘Maybe Harry thinks I’m na-
ı ¨ve.’’ In addition, Harry doesn’t necessarily
know that Sally knows that he knows; he
might think to himself, ‘‘Maybe Sally
thinks I’m obtuse.’’ Although there is indi-
vidual knowledge, there is no common
knowledge, and they can maintain the
fiction of friendship. In contrast, if Harry
were to have said, ‘‘Would you like to
come up and have sex?’’ then Harry
knows that Sally knows that Harry knows
that Sally knows, and so on. With this
common knowledge, they cannot maintain
the fiction of a friendship, and they would
have the sense that ‘‘it’s out there,’’ and
that ‘‘he can’t take it back.’’
The ultimate reason that common
knowledge would mandate a relationship
change is that the alternative—maintain-
ing the relationship in the presence of
common knowledge that contradicts it—
would entail the listener relinquishing her
claim to rationality, resolve, or honesty.
She would be admitting that, despite pos-
sessing knowledge that is incompatible
with the presumptions of pure friendship,
she is willing to pay the costs or exploit
the perquisites that go with it (e.g., ac-
cepting or offering favors without expecta-
tion of reciprocation). Similar tacit confes-
sions would be entailed by other failures
to change a relationship following a com-
monly known direct overture, as in bribes
and threats.
This three-part theory (plausible deni-
ability, relationship negotiation, and
language as a digital medium) makes nu-
merous empirical predictions about how
people interpret the intent and perceive
the relationship between a speaker and a
hearer depending on the level of indirect-
ness in the speaker’s words. The plausible-
deniability hypothesis predicts that the
directness of speakers’ wording of a veiled
bribe or other overture (assessed on lin-
guistic grounds) is not an arbitrary social
ritual, like saying ‘‘Please’’ and ‘‘Thank
you,’’ but is predictable from strategic fac-
tors affecting its expected utility, such as
the proportion of honest and dishonest
officers in an area, the cost of a bribe, the
cost of a ticket, and the cost of a bribery
charge. For the listener’s part, the direct-
ness of a speech act should predict their
subjective estimates of the likelihood that
the speaker intended the fraught proposi-
tion as opposed to making an innocent
remark. The relationship-negotiation hy-
pothesis predicts that indirect speech
should be judged as generating less awk-
wardness and discomfort, as being more
respectful, as better acknowledging the
expected relationship with the hearer
(such as affection, deference, or collegial-
ity), and as making it easier for the partic-
ipants to resume their normal relationship
should the offer be rebuffed. The digital-
medium hypothesis predicts that overt
speech should be judged as certain in in-
tent—that listeners and overhearers
should assess the probability of a direct
proposition as 1.0, with negligible variance
among people, whereas even the most
direct innuendo should be perceived as
admitting of nonzero uncertainty, and
with substantial variance. Finally, overt
speech, compared with indirect speech,
should be perceived as lossless in chains
of gossip (the last link in a chain should
be as confident in the speaker’s intent as
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knowledge (the speaker and hearer should
be as confident in their interpretation of
the other’s interpretation of their interpre-
tation as they are in the simple interpreta-
tion itself).
The theory leads to further hypotheses
about even higher-order psychological
processes that might be triggered by peo-
ple’s experience in tendering and inter-
preting indirect speech. For example,
hearers may credit a speaker with consid-
eration for their dignity and feelings, or
with greater social intelligence, if he uses
indirect speech in a skillful way.
Most generally, indirect speech is a
unique window into human social life (4).
If these analyses are correct, the phenom-
enon reveals a number of important facts
about social behavior in Homo sapiens.
Humans employ several, mutually incom-
patible, modes of cooperation and, as a
result, are extremely touchy about their
relationships. With some of their fellows
(typically kin, lovers, and friends), they
freely share and do favors; with others,
they jockey for dominance; with still oth-
ers, they trade goods and favors. People
distinguish these relationships sharply, and
when one person breaches the logic of a
relationship with another, they both suffer
an emotional cost. Nonetheless, humans
often have to risk these breaches to get on
with the business of life, and they often
use language to do so. In exploring the
boundaries of relationship types, humans
anticipate what other humans think about
the relationship: what the other party in
the relationship thinks; what overhearers
and gossipers think; and what the other
party thinks about what they think about
what the other party thinks about what
they think, and so on. The need to pre-
serve their relationships while transacting
the business of their lives can thus explain
humans’ tendency to fill their social life
with innuendo, hypocrisy, and taboo.
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